The Art of the Possible and the Folly of Over-reaching: A Model of Middle East Politics.

The following post was first published in The Guvnor Times, where I now contribute as the Middle East Editor. For up-to-date articles and opinions please visit The Guvnor Times via the link on the side bar.


In this, my debut, post at The Guvnor Times, I want to introduce my modus operandi for analyzing developments in the Middle East. I am calling it “the art of the possible and the folly of over-reaching.” In the last few decades, a number of critical events stand out as turning points in their historical significance. Most of these events, unfortunately have been acts of over-reaching; where the decision makers take actions that breach the boundaries of what the region is willing to tolerate. The results of these actions have been an inverse of what was intended. Obviously, not every event in the Middle East has a historical significance, but in essence most events can be judged as whether they reflect realism and accommodation to the region's natural historical development or whether they push and defy that process. Granted, it is almost impossible to determine before hand the end results of one's actions but that does not prevent our judgment of possible outcomes and reactions.

Here is a brief review of some significant events for illustration.

Syria in Lebanon: For over a decade Syria had virtual control in Lebanon through political allies, an intrusive military presence and meddling intelligence services. When the legal term of the the Lebanese President came to an end last year, Syria demanded a constitutional change to allow the President another term. To assure this demand, the Syrian president Al Assad, summoned Rafik Al-Hariri, then the prime minister of Lebanon and bullied him into acceeding to Syria's demands. Al Hariri did Syria's bidding and then resigned. Meanwhile, Syria's crude heavy handedness inscensed many in Lebanon and prompted France to cooperate with the US in passing a UN security council resolution demanding Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. Rafik Al Hariri was assassinated a few months after and Syria could not avoid being implicated in that act. Following the assassination, a wide and popular protest movement swept over Lebanon and it was coupled with International outrage and pressure. Syria had to quickly resort to a humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon.

The US in Iraq: The misguided assumptions and estimates which plagued America's planning for the war in Iraq, and the management of the country afterward are well documented. At the heart of these decisions lie two over-reaching strategies, the first was the decision to reinvent Iraq from scratch, which started with the dismissal of the majority of the Iraqi Army, and continued with the debathification of the civil services. This resulted in widespread Sunni resentment and an inflammation of the insurgency. Second, a grandiose vision that Iraq could accommodate American military presence and be a focus for change in the Middle East, specifically, its neighbors, Iran and Syria. This has resulted in a tighter cooperation between Syria and Iran and their covert support of the insurgency. At the present both countries see no interest in stability in Iraq and benefit from keeping the American army overstretched and on the defensive.

Clinton's Camp David Peace Conference: President Clinton, who was deeply involved throughout his presidency with the Oslo peace process, wanted to leave the White House with the ultimate historical prize of delivering peace between Israel and the Palestinians. To do so he “invited” the parties to a conference for final status agreements without proper planning or having an accepted draft of an agreement. Instead of getting his coveted Nobel Prize, Clinton was flanked by an arrogant Israeli leader determined to force the Palestinians to deal on Israel's terms, and a reluctant Palestinian President who, did not have a clear idea of what he wanted nor what he could sell his people. With his wife running for the senate in the New York State, Clinton had no choice but to blame the failure of the peace conference on the Palestinians. The result was the second intifada with its savagery that almost put an end to the possibility of peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel's War in Lebanon: There are many troubling similarities in Israel's misadventure in Lebanon from 1982-2000, and Americas war in Iraq. Originally, the Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin, told the Israelis that the invasion of Lebanon was a limited measure of self-defense to remove the threat of attacks on Israel by PLO fighters and their long range weapons. But in reality, Begin and his defense minister Ariel Sharon had a much more ambitious plan aimed at reshaping the Middle East. Eventually, Israel occupied large parts of Lebanon and its capitol Beirut. Under the threat of Israeli tanks, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon and a new Lebanese President was appointed; who Israel hoped to sign a peace agreement with. Israel's house of cards in Lebanon collapsed following the assassination of the President of Lebanon and the revenge massacres that followed. A popular Shiite insurgency evolved in Southern Lebanon and became Hizbullah, which with Iranian and Syrian assistance vexed and battled Israel with suicide bombers and road side bombs. Israel withdrew unilaterally from South Lebanon, in what is seen as the first ever Arab victory against the Israeli army and what became a source of inspiration to the Islamist Palestinian resistance in the West Bank and Gaza.

Nasser and the Six-Days War: Israel's surprise attack on Egypt in 1967 came as a reaction to a number of reckless pronouncements and actions by Egypt's president, Jamal Abd al-Nassir. Nassir was aware that neither his army nor Syria's were in any shape to win a war with Israel. Still he embarked on showmanship that Israel could only interpret as signs of an eminent war. Israel then took the initiative and attacked Egypt, then Syria and Jordan and took control of the Gaza, the Golan Heights and the West Bank.

In contrast to these events, there are some examples where a measured and realistic decision making has resulted in remarkable opportunities in the Middle East.

Sadat's 1973 War: Anwar al-Sadat was realistic in his evaluating of the limited military capabilities the Arab armies had against Israel's. He had abandoned the idea of the destruction of Israel and wanted to find a way to initiate a peace agreement with it. To do so he initiated the well prepared and minimalist attack to cross the Suez canal in 1973. This limited success allowed him the strategic opportunity to offer peace to Israel four years later, and eventually led to the general Arab realization that peace with Israel is inevitable.

This years' Elections in Lebanon: Following the withdrawal of the Syrian armies, the Lebanese were able to engage in new elections that on the surface seemed open and democratic. But at its core, Lebanese politics is based on a historical system of sectarian divisions, mandates and balances that has limited validity in the population's current distribution. Still the old agreement remains successful because it is what's possible to maintain civil discourse and unity within Lebanon's fractured society.

Israel's withdrawal from Gaza: Israel's settlements project in the occupied territories has been based on zealous religious and nationalistic sentiments without any rational consideration of its costs and benefits. After many years of denial, Ariel Sharon came to the realistic conclusion that Israel's presence in the Gaza strip was a dead end. The withdrawal has now opened new opportunities for a realistic management of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and could restore the possibility of peace that was shattered with the collapse of Clinton's Camp David conference.

Looking ahead:
The Middle East remains a dangerous and fluid place and many of its principals will have to commit to actions that could be dangerously over reaching or that flow in measured natural development. Here are some things to look for.

1- The Israeli right: The Likud party in Israel is scheduled to convene its central committee next month, with the most likely result of removing Ariel Sharon as a prime minister and bringing forth early elections. The Israeli right is yet to abandon the dream of Greater Israel and the subjugation of the Palestinians. The actions of the Likud party promises to shake up the political map of Israel. Will the general Israeli public take a cue from Gaza and support further removal of settlements for peace?

2- Hamas: The Palestinian Islamic Resistant movement is, I believe, at a cross roads. The Palestinian Authority is pressuring it to abandon its military and terrorist actions, to join the PLO, and participate in the upcoming elections in January. Hamas still calls for the destruction of Israel and regards any peace agreement as only a stage towards that larger goal. This maximalist position can not help the Palestinians gain International support, which they critically need. If Hamas does not cooperate with the PA and moderate its activities then violent confrontations among the Palestinians and between the Palestinians and Israel are inevitable.

3- The War in Iraq: The vote on the constitution in October is another milestone that the Bush administration has been eagerly anticipating for but the results now look less than rosy. What would the Bush administration's new approach be following the vote and under the shadow of American mid term elections next year? Would it stick to the lofty hope of a democratic Iraq to transform the Middle East, or will it start looking for a regional, uglier but more realistic exit strategy with possible cooperation with Iran and Syria? How will the Shiite react to a possible torpedo of the Constitution by the Sunnis, and the prospect of more deadly attacks against them? How long are they willing to take the beating before they resort to widespread revenge, leading to civil war that the Sunnis can not possibly afford?

4- Egypt and Democracy in the Arab World: The re-election of President Mubarak to a new term is certain. With Mubarak playing the helpful role of the big Arab brother in Palestine and in smoothing things out with Israel, it is doubtful that the democratic movement in Egypt will have any significant support from the International community at this point. Will the President of Yemen remain true to his promise of not running for re-election next year and become one of the rare Arab Presidents who gives up power willingly? How long will the Baathist regime in Syria holdout against meaningful political reforms? How far will the King of Jordan lead his country on the promised road of constitutional Monarchy? And many many other questions! Stay tuned.